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Abstract
In this paper we consider trends in the distribution of player talent across association
football clubs over time. Player talent is the most important prerequisite for team
success in professional sports leagues and changes in players’ assortativeness in re-
gard to the clubs they play for may arguably be an important factor for changes in
competitive balance. We offer a new approach for measuring player talent and its
distribution - the partial correlation of each player with the goal margin. We use
this measure to analyze the degree of competitive balance over time. This approach
enables us to examine how player mobility drives competitive balance over time.
Empirical results are based on 19 seasons of the first two divisions of the German
Bundesliga as well as domestic cup games. Our results show a decrease in com-
petitive balance over time; better teams tend to attract increasingly better players.
We show that this is driven by an increasingly unequal inter-divisional distribution
of teams, coaches and players, as well as increasing assortativeness in the 1st Bun-
desliga. We further demonstrate that player transfers between Bundesliga teams re-
sults in assortative matching between players and teams. These domestic transfers
do not, however, explain the reduction in competitive balance over time. Further-
more, we show that UEFA Champions League payments may have contributed to
the reduction in competitive balance over the last two decades.
JEL Classification: Z2; J44; J63; L51; L83
Keywords: competitive balance, uncertainty of outcome, player mobility, playing talent,
football, association football, soccer, sports economics, Bundesliga, UEFA champions
league
∗Special thanks go to Martin Kiefel, Bernd Fitzenberger, Bernd Frick, Jan Höcker, Martin Hud, François
Laisney, Michael Lechner, Tim Pawlowski, Andreas Peichl, Vera Schmitz, Thomas Walter and seminar
participants at ZEW Mannheim and Universität St. Gallen, 7th ESEA Conference on Sports Economics
in Zurich (2015), 20th Conference of the German Association of Sport Economics and Sport Management
(2016) and International Conference Sport Economics & Sport Management (SESM, 2016). This paper
was previously circulated as “Competitive Balance in the German Bundesliga: A Fixed Effects Approach”.
†University of Mannheim. E-mail: rsittl@mail.uni-mannheim.de
‡ZEW Centre for European Economic Research Mannheim. E-mail: warnke@zew.de.
1
1 Introduction and Literature
Trends in competitive balance, or the lack of predictability of competitions, is widely dis-
cussed amongst fans, officials and academics interested in association football (e.g. The
Economist, 2016).1 Competitive balance refers to the distribution of playing talent across
clubs and the resulting uncertainty about match or championship outcomes. New broad-
casting deals, such as that in the English Premier League, further intensify this debate,
raising awareness of diverging financial power and inequality across and within leagues
in Europe. The ongoing domination of the German Bundesliga by Bayern München, for
example, often dampens the fans’ of other Bundesliga clubs enthusiasm about the limited
success of their teams. Fans of small market teams often complain about ‘buying up poli-
cies’ of large market teams. Such policies inhibit the equal distribution of player talent and
consequently diminish competitive balance. To take one example, Robert Lewandowski
was transferred from Borussia Dortmund, a contender for winning the league, to the most
successful team, Bayern München. Likewise, Borussia Dortmund was able to attract
promising player talent from less successful Bundesliga clubs, as in the case of Marco
Reus in 2012 (Borussia Mönchengladbach to Borussia Dortmund).
Whilst this pattern is certainly evident on an anecdotal level, this study shall empir-
ically analyze whether any trends exist in terms of the assortative matching of players
to teams.2 By looking at the degree of assortative matching for each season, we exam-
ine trends in competitive balance within the last two decades in the German Bundesliga.
This study contributes to the existing literature by offering a novel approach to measuring
performance in football and a new method of investigating trends in competitive balance,
focusing on changes in the distribution of player talent across clubs. Looking at single
match data, we draw on up-to-the-minute lineup data as an indicator of the performance of
players, teams and coaches. Through estimation of our player, team and coach measures,
we are able to decompose success in football (measured by the goal margin achieved)
into long-term and medium-term institutional effects (team strength and ability to attract
better coaches) and actual player talent (a more short- and medium-term measure of per-
formance). Utilizing the tendency of players and coaches to switch frequently between
teams, we examine whether better players are evermore at better clubs, or whether long-
and short-term success increasingly go hand in hand.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we discuss theoretical and empirical
findings on competitive balance and outline features of the German Bundesliga during the
last two decades and Section 3 introduces our data set and empirical framework. Section
4 provides regression results and our subsequent interpretation regarding competitive bal-
ance. Section 5 provides some conclusions. We demonstrate the robustness of the results
1In the paper we use the term football for association football or soccer.
2The concept of assortative matching is based on marriage market models. This term is used to describe
mating between partners and spouses in terms of education, income etc. In the literature of, for example,
job mobility, assortative matching refers to matching of high-wage workers to high-wage firms and low-
wage workers and low-wage firms. In this paper, assortative matching/assortativeness relates to matching
of better players (workers) to better teams (firms) and vice versa.
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in the Appendix.
2 Background
2.1 Literature Review
The empirical literature analyzing competitive balance varies in its measurement of com-
petitive balance as it can be interpreted in various ways. For example, it can refer to the
number of different teams winning a title or how points are distributed across clubs at
the end of a season. However, in the theoretical literature it is commonly agreed that the
distribution of talent defines competitive balance. Therefore, we define competition in
a league as balanced if there is an equal and stable distribution of talent across teams.
This connection between player talent and competitive balance was first stated and theo-
retically analyzed by Rottenberg [1956] who pinned down the peculiarities of the sports
industry and investigated the effects of the reserve clause (limiting player mobility) in
American baseball. As described by Cairns et al. [1986], there are specific demand-side
externalities to this industry:
For a single club its own playing success will also be significant. Hence a given team
may have incentives to continue increasing its playing strength vis-à-vis its competitors,
generating attendances for itself without taking account of any external costs of reduced
attendances elsewhere, due to lessened uncertainty of outcome.
This peculiarity of sports economics is also described in Neale [1964] by the Louis-
Schmeling Paradox refering to the two famous boxers. While firms in ’normal’ markets
seek for monopoly in order to maximize profit and diminish competition, there would be
no profits at all in sports if there were no surviving competitors. Louis needs Schmeling
(and vice versa) in order to create an entertaining competition.
The important question in the literature is whether teams internalize these demand-
side externalities and whether rich clubs [...] outbid the poor for talent, taking all the
competent players for themselves and leaving only the incompetent for the other teams
Rottenberg [1956]. Rottenberg, however, finds that there is no need for a reserve clause
or other restriction on player mobility to ensure competitive balance. This result is known
as the invariance principle, which is primarily derived from the assumption that clubs are
profit maximizers and that they internalize these externalities. Sloane [1971] has ques-
tioned whether this assumption can be applied to European football, deriving a model
in which teams are thought to be utility maximizers subject to a budget constraint. In
this setting, there is no equilibrating force towards competitive balance. Top players are
attracted to big market teams in order to maximize the probability of winning. In this set-
ting, a balanced competition is not necessarily reached endogenously, see Koning [2009]
for an overview. This setting gives justification for imposing restriction rules on com-
petition, as analyzed, for example, by Szymanski und Késenne [2004] for gate revenue
sharing. This short review shows that a not too equal distribution of playing talent is a
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vital element of sports industries. These theoretical models give ambiguous predictions
about whether competitive balance is an equilibrium or not. Therefore, we offer a novel
approach to look empirically at trends in competitive balance, measured by the changing
distribution of playing talent across clubs, for two decades of the German Bundesliga.
Empirical research on trends in competitive balance generally returns ambiguous re-
sults concerning changes in Germany. It is not clear whether competitive balance has
actually decreased or remained stable throughout the history of the Bundesliga. Goossens
[2005], Feddersen [2006], Feddersen und Maennig [2005] , Koning [2009] and Haan
et al. [2007] detect no significant changes in competitive balance, whereas Pawlowski
et al. [2010], Partosch [2014], Groot [2008] and Michie und Oughton [2004] have found
evidence for decreasing competitive balance. Similar results are found for other Euro-
pean leagues. Generally, results vary depending on domestic leagues, time periods and
on the application of different measures of competitive balance. In the case of decreasing
competitive balance, changes can be attributed to regulatory developments, as in the case
for gate revenue sharing, investigated by Robinson und Simmons [2014]. Other factors
determining competitive balance include the Bosman Ruling, as investigated by Binder
und Findlay [2011], or the Champions League, see e.g. Pawlowski et al. [2010]. The
majority of these studies primarily apply descriptive methods based on final rankings, an-
alyzing competitive balance based on aggregated seasonal outcomes and assessing trends
by tracking competitive balance measures over time, such as the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index or the standard deviation of winning percentage. To our best knowledge, no study
has yet directly analysed the distribution of playing talent across clubs.
The direct channel of transfers and its effect on competitive balance has rarely been
analyzed in sports. Maxcy et al. [2007] analyzes Baseball player transfers after changing
the MLB’s system of revenue sharing to a more egalitarian system. Maxcy et al. [2007]
finds that this change in 1997 resulted in increased divesting in talent of low revenue
producing clubs. For football, Robinson und Simmons [2014] examine player mobility
before and after the abolishment of gate revenue sharing in England. They find increased
probability of better quality players to move to bigger teams afterwards (inter- and intra-
divisional). But rather than looking directly at player distribution, these studies investigate
changes in player movement after certain league policy changes.
Summing up, it is generally acknowledged that player talent is the most important
factor determining (long-term) success of football teams, as seen, for example, in the
high correlation between average team wage bill and performance, compare Hall et al.
[2002]. Theoretically, Rottenberg [1956] and Késenne [2000] assume the distribution of
player talent to be a crucial determinant of competitive balance: ‘Competitive balance in
a sports league [...] depends primarily on the distribution of player talent among teams’.
Given the importance of the debate and the rich literature on this topic (e.g. Szymanski
[2001] or Flores et al. [2010]), it is surprising that there are only a few studies which
actually consider disaggregated player data. Most studies simply rely on information
about end-of-season league position to look at trends in competitive balance. We use
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a new measure of player performance, similar to the Plus-Minus statistic used in ice-
hockey. By focusing on the team’s net scoring, compare for example Macdonald et al.
[2012], this individual performance measure has been successfully applied to estimate
a player’s impact on a match in other sports than football.3 Our performance estimates
then enable us to identify changes in the assortativeness of players to teams, thus enabling
these trends to be connecting with competitive balance.
2.2 Bundesliga in 1998-2016
The Bundesliga is one of the "Big Five" leagues in Europe which dominate continental
club football competitions. Findings based on the German league are therefore highly
relevant for other sports leagues in Europe and further afield. Providing a background
for the empirical analysis, this passage briefly summarizes the main structural changes in
German professional football in the course of the last 19 seasons, giving an overview of
the economic and sporting development in the Bundesliga.
Figure 1: Revenue and Expenditure Streams
Source: DFL [2006–2015] and UEFA [2004–2015], Partosch [2014]. No data is available for 1997/98,
for 2015/16 and for the 2nd Bundesliga before 2003/04.
Economic Development
At first sight the period between 1998 and 2016 can be economically characterized as
a boom period for the German Bundesliga. A more detailed look at the development
of different revenue and expenditure streams of all clubs in the Bundesliga, however,
using reports on the economic situation of the Bundesliga (published annually by the
DFL [2006–2015]) and information gathered by Feddersen [2006] and Partosch [2014],
3While writing this paper, we became aware of another paper using a similar model to look at player
performance in football: Sæbø und Hvattum [2015] concurrently show the usefulness of this measure for
football analysis using transfer fees as outcome. However, this study neither looks at the team dimension
nor refers to competitive balance.
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reveals that the period considered in our study can in fact be separated into two to three
different periods. Financial data is available for the seasons from 1998/99 to 2014/15.
Figure 1 plots the logarithm total wage bill for licensed player by division for each
season plus UEFA Champions League revenues to top teams. For the 1st Bundesliga, per-
sonnel expenditures follow a corresponding progress throughout the period. There was
a large increase in playing staff expenditures in the early period (1998-2002). This is
caused by a huge increase in TV-right revenues. The Kirch media group was the major
contributor to this development, investing massively in Bundesliga TV rights at the turn
of the millennium.4 The turning point was caused by the Kirch insolvency in 2002 and the
following 5-6 seasons are characterized by an adjustment process in the aftermath of this.
From 2008 onwards, all revenue and expenditure categories in the 1st Bundesliga grew
constantly throughout these seasons. A very similar distinction in periods can be observed
for Champions League revenues of German clubs (see Figure 1), strongly connected to
their international sporting success, as will be discussed below. The development in the
2nd Bundesliga, for which no data is available before 2004, is more influenced by the rele-
gation of certain well-endowed teams, the peak in 2008 is for example due to the presence
of teams such as Bor. Mönchengladbach, 1899 Hoffenheim or FC Köln. The difference in
personnel expenditures between the 1st and 2nd Bundesliga has considerably grown over
time, it more than doubled from 402 million Euro in 2004 to 826 million Euro in 2015.
Regulatory and Sporting Development
Besides a change in the format of relegation, no major regulatory changes took place
between 1997-2016. Prior to 2008/09, three teams were promoted or relegated between
the first two divisions of the German Bundesliga at the end of each season. Since 2008,
when the relegation playoff was introduced, the team finishing 16th in the first league
plays the team placed third in the second league.5 Since 2009, only two play-offs have
been won by the lower division team. In total, only eight teams have stayed in the 1st
Bundesliga during the entire sample period.
The championship outcome in the 1st Bundesliga is mainly dominated by FC Bayern
München, who won the Bundesliga 12 times during the observed 19-year period. The
remaining 7 championship titles are distributed as follows: three times Borussia Dort-
mund and once Werder Bremen, VfB Stuttgart, VfL Wolfsburg and FC Kaiserslautern.
Some teams were able to compete with FC Bayern München during more than one sea-
son. These teams, however, such as Werder Bremen since 2010/11 or Borussia Dort-
mund between 2004/05 and 2009/10, failed to regularly qualify for international cham-
pionships. No other team than Bayern München showed a consistently excellent level
of performance, winning a record four consecutive championship titles between 2012/13
and 2015/16.
4Compare Frick und Prinz [2006] who give an overview of the development of the financial situation in
the Bundesliga up to 2003.
5During the entire Bundesliga period, there was already a relegation play-off in place between 1982 and
1991.
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Figure 2: Share of Games won per Season by Top Four Teams (By End-of-Season League
Position)
Note: The lines represent non-parametric kernel density regression curves.
This dominance is also reflected in Figure 2 which shows a standard measure of com-
petitive balance; the average share of games won by the four best teams according to
the end-of-season league table for the first two divisions.6 For the 1st Bundesliga this
measure shows a more or less continuous increase in the dominance of the top teams or,
accordingly, a decrease in competitive balance over time. In contrast, no trend is observed
for the 2nd Bundesliga.
3 Data and Empirical Framework
Match day reports taken from the online web page of the German Kicker Sportmagazin
provide the data base. It contains detailed match day data for 11,626 matches played in
the first two divisions of the German Bundesliga between 1997/1998 and 2015/2016.7
Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of this data set. Furthermore, we add all DFB-
Pokal (German Cup) games between teams which play in a given season in one of the
first two divisions. This allows us to observe in-season matches between teams from the
two different divisions and increases the precision of our results. To assure comparability
between Bundesliga and cup matches, we use the results achieved in cup matches after 90
minutes, ignoring extra time or penalty shootout.8
6This graph looks very similar for other measures, e.g. the standard deviation of points.
7There are 5,813 games in each divisions. Two games (one in each division) are missing because those
games were judged by the DFB sports court after the game. These are St. Pauli vs Schalke 04 in the first
division in 2010/11 and FC Rot-Weiß Erfurt vs SpVgg Unterhaching, 2004/05 in the second division.
8Including German Cup games does not alter our results. The number of draws after 90 minutes is quite
similar between Bundesliga matches (26.3%) and German Cup matches (26.7%) and statistically they are
not distinguishable from each other (according to a t-test, p-value: 0.84). The front runner wins almost
55% of cup matches after 90 minutes between two teams from different divisions and in only 20% of the
6
Table 1 shows the sample sizes of the whole sample and the subset of players and
coaches we use in most analyses. In general we include only players who have played
in at least 50 games in the two divisions, and consider coaches who have Bundesliga
tenure of at least 18 games. Estimation of player or coach performance is very imprecise
for individuals with only few observations. We show in the Appendix that the sample
restriction does not change our results.
The number of matches and teams is not reduced in the restricted sample.9 Further
information is available in the Appendix.
Table 1: Descriptives of the Population and the Main Sample (Players >= 50 Games and
Coaches > 17 Games)
Total 1st Bundesliga 2nd Bundesliga German Cup
# Matches 12,133 5,813 5,813 507
# Teams 73 36 65 72
# Players 5,072 2,795 3,736 3,224
# Players ( >=50 Games) 2,140 1,645 1,601 1,469
# Coaches 364 170 285 222
# Coaches ( >17 Games) 215 127 171 181
Note: We include only German Cup games between two teams which both play in either of the top two
divisions of the Bundesliga in a given season. The row "Players ( >=50 Games)" should be read as follows
(similar for coaches with more than 17 games): There are 2,140 players who appear in at least 50 matches
in the both divisons or the cup, 1,645 out of them play at least one of those 50+ games in the 1st Bundesliga.
As already stated, we first introduce a new performance measure for player, team and
coach performance which we then use to investigate changes in competitive balance over
time. This performance measure is the partial correlation of each player (and team and
coach) with the goal margin, derived from a simple linear regression of goals scored minus
goals conceded (taking into account the exact minutes when goals were scored or how the
lineup changed through substitutions or dissmissals) on players, team and coaches, plus a
few control variables.
Though rarely used in the empirical literature, goal margin is a particularly suitable
measure to reflect inequality in player talent. Firstly, player productivity, in terms of the
goal margin outcome, can be directly and frequently observed on an almost weekly basis,
without the need to aggregate a huge number of statistics (and is aplicable also for the
youth sector where detailed statistics are not available). Secondly, it captures the defen-
sive and attacking quality of teams. Both components are probably more or less equally
important, particularly for competitiveness in the long run. Thirdly, the goal margin is im-
portant for achieving success in sports such as national championship or cup titles since
winning or losing can be directly derived from the goal margin. Finally, besides capturing
cases does the underdog win, although 62% of those matches are played at the home stadium of the second-
division team (the home distribution between the divisions is skewed due to certain rules that lower-tier
teams are allowed to play at home in early rounds of the cup).
9Although there are many players who play in fewer than 50 games in total, they do not have a large
influence on the results since the distribution of total games played is very right-skewed. Players appearing
in more than 50 games in total account for 86% of all player-game observations and for 88% of all minutes
played.
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variation from match to match, we can also include within-game changes in the lineup by
looking at the exact minutes of goals scored.
To measure separate individual performance, we run a simple linear regression, some-
times referred to as a hierarchical fixed effect model, which captures the goal margin on
player, team and coach fixed effects and further controls:
Goal_Marginit = γi +λJ(i,t)+ϕG(i,t)+λ
O
J(i,t)+ xitβ + εit (1)
Further information about the goal margin is given in the next paragraph. This em-
pirical framework considers all matches from the viewpoint of each player who starts or
is substituted for a team in a given match. The goal margin of player i on match day t
is assumed to be linear function of a player fixed effect γi, a team fixed effect λ j - where
J(i, t) = j if player i plays for team j on match day t-, a coach fixed effect ϕk -where
G(i, t) = k if coach k manages player i on match day t -, opponent fixed effects λOj , time
varying characteristics xit and a noise term εit . xit includes possible league and season
effects (such as rule changes etc.) and a dummy if the player plays for the home team. We
interact the season indicators with league information as well as with the home advantage
indicator to allow home advantage, for example, to vary non-linearly over time. Further-
more, we include the age of players of i at match day t (and age squared) and control for
the number of times players from both teams are sent off during a match (either no dis-
missals, one dismissal or two and more dismissals for a team in a match).10 Our sample
size is 287,685 which means that we observe on average 23.7 players each game, where
each players is observed in at least 50 games during the whole period.11
The goal margin represents the difference between goals scored and goals conceded
for team Ji of player i for the time he is on the pitch. We look at in-game changes by
tracking minutes of substitutions and replacements, dismissals and of course, the timing
of goals scored. The goal margin generally equals the final score for players who appear in
the lineup and are not replaced during a match. Players therefore have a different impact
on a game depending on the total number of minutes played. Equation (1) is estimated via
weighted least squares dummy variable regression.12 Observations are weighted by the
fraction of minutes played in each match. Accordingly, players replaced in minute x are
weighted by x/91, players brought in minute x are weighted by (91− x)/91 and players
starting and finishing a match are weighted by 1.
The following example, Bayern München vs. FC Augsburg (32nd match day, 2014/15),
illustrates our approach. Bayern München lost on home ground 0:1, with Augsburg’s
Bobadilla scoring in the 71st minute. Table 2 depicts information for three selected play-
ers of this match in our final data set. Philipp Lahm was chosen to be in the starting
line up by his coach Guardiola, but he was replaced in the 14th minute. Since the score
10Results are robust to not including age and age squared.
11The maximum is 28 since 22 players are in the starting lineup and up to 3 players in each team may be
replaced during match. Teams tend to use all 6 possible substitutions in the majority of games (in slightly
more than two-thirds of all matches).
12Results are very similar if we estimate Equation (1) via ridge regression, see Appendix A.2.2.
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up to this point was 0:0, Philip Lahm’s contribution in this match is a goal margin of 0
and he is weighted by the fraction 0.15 in this match. Meanwhile, his team-mate Robert
Lewandowski played on the pitch until the 74th minute and was therefore on the pitch
when Augsburg scored their winning goal. Hence, he is observed with a goal difference
of -1 and he is weighted by the fraction 0.81 in this match. Additionally, since Bayern
München received a red card in this match, we control for the number of players on the
pitch, as well as for the number of players for the opposing team. To take one example
from FC Augsburg, Abdual Rahman Baba played through all the minutes and is therefore
weighted by 1 and attributed a goal difference of 1. Since his team received no red card,
the number of players on the pitch for FC Augsburg is 11, while their opposing team,
Bayern München, only had 10 players on the pitch.
Table 2: Example: Bayern Munich vs. FC Augsburg (09/05/2015)
Goal Difference 0 -1 1
Player P. Lahm R. Lewandowski A. Baba
Team Bayern München Bayern München FC Augsburg
Coach Guardiola Guardiola Weinzierl
Home Ground 1 1 0
Minute Out 14 74 91
Minute Fraction 0.15 0.81 1
Age 31 26 20
Number of Players on Pitch, Team 10 10 11
Number of Players on Pitch, Opponent 11 11 10
Returning to our empirical framework, the player component γi is interpreted as the
average impact of a player on the goal margin, involving a combination of different skills,
such as work rate and a talent factor. With regard to competitive balance, γi represents
a short-run factor for explaining performance inequality. In contrast, λ j reflects long-
run team heterogeneity. λ j influences team performance as an average institutional goal
premium (or expectation), capturing, for example, the effectiveness of official boards in
constructing a competitively viable team, the quality of training facilities and other re-
sources, such as physical therapists among others. Additionally, ϕk reflects the average
effectiveness/ability of each coach, controlled for the amount of player talent and re-
sources available. In line with the interpretation of the other parameters, the coach effect
captures performance heterogeneity in the medium run. Time varying characteristics in-
clude season dummies, opponent fixed effects and a home dummy. Opponent fixed effects
λOJ(i,t) control for the opponent team j faces on match day t and the home dummy repre-
sents a goal premium evoked by the home advantage. Fan support or a greater tendency
to play more aggressively and offensively on home ground provide evidence for the home
advantage in soccer, which is not assumed to be part of competitive balance. Furthermore,
the impact of a single player is not fixed and may change over the life-course. We there-
fore add age and age squared to capture career-related performance changes. Equation
(1) does not take into account that the outcome is the same for all players of one team in
a given match. We run another specification on the match level to account for possible
effects of fellow players, among others, which gives similar results and is described in the
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Appendix.
Hierarchical fixed effects models have become popular in different fields in economics
in recent years. Bertrand und Schoar [2003] for example looked at the effects of managers
on firm performance while Chetty et al. [2014] use such an approach to study long-term
effects of teacher quality on students. Card et al. [2013] decompose changes in variation
of individual wages in West-Germany with respect to variation of person and establish-
ment effects. Hentschel et al. [2014] transfer this model to football by analyzing the
impact of coaches on team success between 1993/1994 and 2013/2014 (without consid-
ering player talent). Applying a very parsimonious approach, they include team fixed
effects, coach effects and half season effects in order to explain the average number of
points gained by a coach during a half season. Exploiting the fact that coaches move fre-
quently between teams, they are able to disentangle coach and team fixed effects. Whilst
the findings are interesting in their own right, facilitating the identification of under- and
over-performing coaches, they also provide evidence that coaches or executives generally
play a considerable role, affecting organizational performance.
The available data set turns out to be particularly suitable for this indicator of perfor-
mance. The important feature of this data set is the availability of a high share of players
and coaches moving between teams – a prerequisite for the precise estimation of their sep-
arate impact on sporting success [Abowd und Kramarz, 1999]. The system of relegation
and promotion in football also contributes to a high fluctuation of players, coaches and
teams between seasons. Amongst all players in our sample, an average of 50% remain in
the same team from one season to another, 15% move to another team in our sample and
35% drop out of the sample (e.g. retire or move abroad). Table 7 shows that more than
70% of all players with at least 50 games play for at least two different teams. The same is
true for 58% of all coaches (with at least 17 games). For our main sample of players who
appear in at least 50 Bundesliga games, 59% are retained, 19% move and 22% drop out.
Regarding teams, only eight teams managed to stay in the 1st Bundesliga all 19 seasons,
while 28 different teams were relegated to the second division at least once in the course
of the 19 seasons. As relegation is connected with great losses in revenues, the likelihood
of a team being relegated is closely related to changes in the distribution of talent across
teams.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Player and Team Performance
Before considering trends in competitive balance (in Section 4.2), we will provide an
overview of the results from estimating Equation (1). We focus here on the results de-
rived from the sample of players who appear in at least 50 games. Further analyses and
robustness checks to other specifications are available in the Appendix.
Results are generally in line with expectations and with existing literature. Unsurpris-
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ingly, home advantage is associated with a large and statistically significant advantage
with respect to the goal margin. This applies across all seasons, comparable to having one
top player (98th-percentile of the player performance distribution) on the pitch rather than
one median player.13 The magnitude of the home advantage is comparable between both
divisions of the Bundesliga, but it is larger in the German Cup. It decreases strongly over
time, the reduction being by more than 40% over the sample period (see Table 3. Age fol-
lows an inverse U-shaped pattern with player performance with an insignificant positive
coefficient for the linear age term and a strong and highly significant negative coefficient
for age squared. The estimated decline in performance with age is considerable; a player
at the age of 30 has on average a lower performance of 0.8 standard deviations of player
fixed effects. Dismissals (yellow/red and red cards) are strongly associated with the goal
margin (for either the own or the opponent team).
Player, team and coach performance measures are all important predictors of the goal
margin. This is shown by simple F-statistics of joint significance, which gives a p-value
of nearly zero for players, teams and coaches, respectively. A variance decomposition
(available upon request) shows that team heterogeneity is the most important performance
dimension, followed by coach differences and finally player heterogeneity.14 Given that
there are eleven players on the pitch, but only one coach for each team, this variation in
the performance measures seems plausible. It highlights the importance of medium to
long-term institutional factors for success in football. The variance decomposition shows
also that the residual variation makes up slightly more than 80% of the total variation.
Again, this is not surprising given the difficulties of predicting football matches and the
discrete nature of our outcome.
Analyzing the estimated effects in more detail, Table 4 presents percentile differences
of team, player and coach effects and their corresponding difference in the goal premium.
For example, a player at the 5th percentile in the player effects distribution, whilst replac-
ing a player at the 95th percentile yields, on average, ceteribus paribus, a goal premium
of 1.03. Particularly in view of the fact that superstars such as Robben, Gündogan or
Thomas Müller are representing the top percentiles of player distribution, the difference
identified in performance and ability is deemed reasonable. These players indeed have
the ability to turn a match around, with high influence on the goal margin outcome due
to their single contribution.15 Figure 12 shows the distribution of player performance for
players who appear only in the 1st Bundesliga (25%), those who always play in the 2nd
Bundesliga in the sample period (23%), and those who play for teams in both divisions
(52%). The distributions look reasonable with a clear hierarchy but considerable over-
lap between players in different divisions. The density estimation is based on the 2,138
individual players who play in at least 50 games during our sample period. The density
13For statistical tests, we carry out multi-way clustering by teams and players as described in Cameron
und Miller [2015] for non-nested hierarchical data.
14As a proxy for this analysis one can look at the standard deviation of teams (sd(λ )≈ 0.522), which is
approximately two-thirds larger than the standard deviation of the player performance distribution (sd(γ)≈
0.307) with coaches being in between (sd(ϕ)≈ 0.376).
15Nonetheless, there are some surprising results for players who have played in relatively few games.
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Table 3: Estimation Results, Sample 50+
Player, Team and Coach Parameters
Number of player effects 2140
Number of team effects 73
Number of coach effects 214
Summary of parameter estimates
Std. dev. of player fixed effects 0.307
Std. dev. of team fixed effects 0.522
Std. dev. of opponent fixed effects 0.510
Std. dev. of coach fixed effects 0.376
Other parameters and statistics
Mean Home advantage in 1998-2000 0.804
Mean Home advantage in 2014-2016 0.468
1 dismissal own team -0.681
2+ dismissals own team -0.917
1 dismissal opponent 0.671
2+ dismissals opponent 0.920
Age (standardized) 0.104
Age squared (standardized) -0.201
RMSE 1.6893
Adjusted R-squared 0.198
Std. dev. of goal margin 1.49
Sample size 287,685
Note: Results from Equation (1). The number of parameter and their standard deviation include reference
groups.
12
estimation is slightly skewed to the left, this is a reflection of the fact that better players
play, on average, in more games. We find a similar convincing hierarchy for the sum of
team and coach effects (see Figure 4).
Player performance measures are closely related to professional grades attributed by
the Kicker sports magazine. Amongst other things, these grades have been used in Bu-
raimo et al. [2015] to analyze moral hazard aspects with respect to contract length of
Bundesliga players. If we run the same Equation (1) for grades rather than for the goal
margin, we find a correlation of ρ ≈−0.79 between our performance measure and the co-
efficients derived from the regression with grades as outcome (in Germany lower grades
are better), see Appendix.
Looking at percentile differences for coach effects, we also see a strong dispersion in
coach abilities. The difference between the 95th and 5th percentile in the coach distri-
butions constitutes a goal margin of approximately 1.26. Again, comparing these results
with common perception of coach ability supports the plausibility of our results. For
instance, top coaches such as Jürgen Klopp or Thomas Tuchel are found in the top per-
centiles of our coach effects distribution (along coaches such as Martin Schmidt who
currently manages Mainz 05 or Edmund Becker who promoted Karlsruher SC to the 1st
Bundesliga). Our results also confirm the importance and great contribution of managers
to organizational success, as illustrated by Hentschel et al. [2014]. We find strong rank
correlation between our estimated coach effects and their coefficients for coaches which
are estimated without taking players into account.
Table 4: Percentile Difference of Team/Player/Coach Fixed Effects in the 50+Sample
Corresponding Goal Margin Impact
Percentile Difference Team FE Player FE Coach FE
95th - 5th 1.53 1.03 1.25
90th - 10th 1.25 0.80 0.92
75th - 25th 0.70 0.42 0.44
75th - 50th 0.32 0.23 0.20
50th - 25th 0.38 0.19 0.24
# Parameter Estimates 73 2140 214
Note: Results from Equation (1). Reference groups are included.
We observe strong trends in average performance over time, which is a well-known
issue for various rating measures (e.g. in chess Elo-ratings which have been adapted to
football). We cannot determine the extent to which this phenomenon is caused by for
example true performance gains over time or reflects statistical artifacts. In the following,
we therefore standardize team, player and coach fixed effects by season by subtracting the
respective season-specific mean effect and dividing by the respective standard deviation
(of players or coaches within a season). Standardizing does not alter the interpretation of
our results because the covariance of standardized variables is simply the correlation.16
16Results regarding player talent are very similar. The Pearson correlation between players (non-
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Where we illustrate aggregated individual performance measures (such as in Figure 4),
we simply average season-specific standardized fixed-effects.
Figure 3: Mean Player Effects
(a) Borussia Dortmund (b) Werder Bremen
(c) 1860 München (d) SpVgg Greuther Fürth
In regard to estimated player productivity, Figure 3 reveals (unsurprisingly) that the
mean player fixed effects and average points have a corresponding development for dif-
ferent teams. A first glance at trends in player performance over time amongst clubs
which are observed in the entire sample period, gives an initial indication of declining
competitive balance.
Amongst the teams who have made gains in terms of player talent are Bayern München,
Bor. Mönchengladbach, FC Schalke 04 and, perhaps surprinsingly, Eintracht Frankfurt.
Teams such as 1. FC Kaiserslautern, 1860 München, 1. FC Nürnberg, Hertha BSC and
Werder Bremen, for example, have lost out in this area.
Looking at Werder Bremen (Figure 3(b)), we can see a strong connection between
standardized) fixed-effects and the mean of the player fixed effects standardized by season is ρ = 0.86
and the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient is ρ = 0.84.
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both measures of performance. In 2003/04 Werder Bremen won the Bundesliga cham-
pionship and in the following seasons were able to regularly qualify for the Champions
League, resulting in steadily rising mean player effects. Failing to regularly qualify for
international competitions since 2008/2009, however, Werder Bremen has experienced a
sharp decline in final league positions, as well as in average player talent. The drop in
mean player performance of Werder Bremen before the season 2008/09 and in 2010/11 is
one of the largest in the whole sample. In summer 2010, Werder Bremen lost Mesut Özil
(to Real Madrid) while Naldo (who won the German cup with Wolfsburg in 2014/15) was
severely injured such that he missed the whole following season. Both Özil and Naldo are
well ranked players. A similar development can be seen for Borussia Dortmund (Figure
3(a)). In this case, however, we can see that the financially challenging seasons between
2004 and 2009 had a rather modest influence on average player talent. In contrast, Borus-
sia Dortmund’s recent success in the Bundesliga is characterized by a huge increase in
player productivity. Robert Lewandowski, Mario Götze and Shinji Kagawa were, for ex-
ample, amongst the best ten players in the season 2011/12. Figures 3(c) and 3(d) show
different trends in player talent for 1860 München and SpVgg Greuther Fürth, two clubs
who played in both divisions during the sample period. While 1860 München shows a
more or less long-term decline in player talent, we see a inverted U-shaped series for
SpVgg Greuther Fürth which succeded to be promoted to the Bundesliga in 2012/13 but
was relegated after only one season.
Regarding team effects, Figure 4 depicts the relation between the estimated (condi-
tional) team effects added to their corresponding mean coach effects and the (uncondi-
tional) average points gained by each team. We find a strong positive relation between the
two measures of team performance (ρ ≈ 0.89).
Figure 4: Team + Mean Coach FE and Mean Points by Match
All together, these results confirm the plausibility of our estimated effects as well as
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the validity of splitting team productivity into a team (long-term), coach (medium term)
and player (short term) component. It also reveals a high dispersion of, for example,
player effects, indeed implying high inequality within the Bundesliga. The next section
addresses this issue by looking at the correlation of player and team effects over time.
4.2 Assortative Matching of Players to Clubs
Returning now to competitive balance, we identify decreasing competitive balance on
the basis of rising assortativeness of players in regard to the teams they play for. We
understand increased assortative matching to imply that teams with high long run produc-
tivity increasingly attracted players with high individual productivity, while players with
low productivity are increasingly signed by teams with lower long run productivity. We
have already seen in the previous section that teams such as Bayern München or Schalke
04 have managed to attract better player talent, but does this indicate rising assortative
matching in general?
To answer this question, we focus on the pattern of player movement by looking at the
correlation between our team and player effects for each season. This correlation indicates
the degree of imbalance for each season, providing insight into whether better players
increasingly migrate to teams which exhibit long-term success. This in turn provides
direct insight into the allocation of talent as a measure of competitive balance.
We look at each club’s squad in a season and analyze the correlation between club
and player fixed effects. The squad consists of all players who participate in at least one
game for a given team during a season (weighted by the number of minutes played to take
into account individuals’ playing time). If players switch clubs in the winter break, they
may therefore appear twice in the sample. Club effects are defined as the sum of team and
coach fixed effects.17
Corx =Cor
(
γ j,T , λ j +ϕ j,T
)
(2)
Where γ j,T are standardized (by season) fixed effects of all players of team j in
season T , λ j are standardized team fixed-effects of team j and ϕ j,T are standardized
and seasonal-averaged coach-fixed effects of team j in season T .18 All parameters are
estimated via Equation (1) and player fixed-effects are weighted by minutes played in
matches in the Bundesliga (1st or 2nd division, German Cup games are not considered
here).
Figure 5(a) plots the correlation coefficient for the main sample, Sample 50+. There is
a clear rising linear trend revealing increased assortative matching throughout the period.
Better players increasingly tend to play for superior teams and the opposite is true for
17An average coach fixed effect is calculated for each season and for each team in order to incorporate
possible coach switches during a season. Results are very similar if we do not consider coaches at all and
just look at the correlation for players and teams.
18Results are almost identical if we look at Cov
(
γ j,T ,
)
= 1N−1 ∑
(
(γ j,T )(λ j + ϕ j,T )
)
as in Card et al.
[2013].
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Figure 5: Assortative Matching
(a) Both Leagues (b) By League
weaker teams.19 This increase was most marked between 2000 and 2003. This was
followed by a more or less linear increase until 2012. Assortative matching seems to have
stagnated on a high level since 2012.20 This is in line with the results of simple measures
such as the share of games won by the top four teams (see Figure 2). This result is also
confirmed by the other specifications and for different sub-samples, as seen for example
in Figure 9 and Figure 10 in the Appendix.
Next, we investigate the reasons for the reduction in aggregated competitive balance
over time. To answer the question whether this development is driven by between or
within divisional transfers, we apply a simple statistical decomposition. We decompose
the pooled correlation of players to clubs using the Law of total variance which also
applies to covariances (for simplicity, we look here at covariance terms):
cov(γ j,T ,λ j +ϕ j,T ) = (3)
= E
[
cov(γ j,T ,λ j +ϕ j,T |Z)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes within 1st and 2nd Bundesliga
+cov
[
E(γ j,T |Z) , E(λ j +ϕ j,T |Z)
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Changes between 1st and 2nd Bundesliga
where Z is a binary variable indicating the division.
The first term in Equation (3) measures distributional changes of playing talent within
both divisions. This terms allows us to analyze whether the decrease in competitive bal-
ance is for example mostly driven by increased inequality in playing talent in the 1st
Bundesliga. Figure 5(b) shows indeed that assortative matching has increased in the 1st
Bundesliga but not in the 2nd Bundesliga. For the former, we witness a strong increase in
19To some limited extent, better players in high-performing teams could also increasingly play more
minutes.
20We place little importance to the drop in competitive balance to the season 2015/16 as there is greater
uncertainty in the first and last seasons in our sample. This is because we observe fewer players in these
seasons who play in a total of at least 50 games, due to the left- and right censoring of our sample. For this
reason, we do not emphasize the negative correlation in the beginning of the sample period which is not
apparent in the results for the Ridge regression which penalizes large coefficients, see Appendix A.2.2.
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the assortativeness of player talent until 2004, followed by slight declines until 2009 and
a subsequent strong increase. This pattern is not observed for the 2nd Bundesliga where
the distribution of player talent remained more or less stable over time (perhaps except
for a drop in assortative matching in recent years).21 In particular, we see increased as-
sortativeness amongst the 19 most established teams which we observe for all seasons in
the sample. There is no trend, however, for the next 19 teams in the sample which we
observe for between 7 and 18 seasons (or for all other teams). Bayern München is the
record champion and the team with the highest fixed-effect (and highest average players
fixed-effect) in the sample. This team is an important driver of this trend because it is
also one of the teams with the largest increase in player talent. The increase in assortative
matching is not, however, only due to Bayern München (see Appendix).
The second term in Equation (3) looks at assortative matching between the two top
divisions. Here we investigate whether the 2nd Bundesliga loses ground to the top divi-
sion. Since inter-divisional financial inequality has widened substantially (see e.g. Frick
und Prinz, 2006 or Figure 1), we expect increasing heterogeneity of player talent over
time between the first and second division. Furthermore, financial inequality has also
increased within the 1st Bundesliga due to UEFA Champions League payments and ad-
vertisement deals. Figure 6 shows the trends in player performance and in the sum of team
and coach performance by division over time. There is a clear trend in both performance
measures. Player talent between the 1st Bundesliga and the 2nd Bundesliga has become
increasingly unequally distributed over time with better players progressively appearing
in the 1st Bundesliga. There are several explanations for this. Firstly, the 1st Bundesliga
progressively managed to retain better players whilst the opposite is true of the 2nd Bun-
desliga. Secondly, weaker players increasingly tend to move down to the second division.
Thirdly, better players tend to play more often (or more minutes) over time in the 1st Bun-
desliga but not in the 2nd Bundesliga. We see a similar trend of increasing polarization
between both divisions for the additive measure of team and coach performance. Coach
performance in particular has become stronger in the 1st Bundesliga but poorer in the
2nd Bundesliga over time. Looking at the only 1st Bundesliga season of SpVgg Greuther
Fürth (see Figure 3), for example, our model would had predicted a positive goal margin
of +14 if Fürth had remained in the 2nd Bundesliga, an absolute difference of 35 in goal
margin compared to the prediction for the 1st Bundesliga. To summarize, it is clear that
the first Bundesliga has become stronger over time, whilst the 2nd Bundesliga has lost
ground.
Next, we link changes in competitive balance (approximated by changes in assorta-
tive matching) to financial information. Unfortunately, only limited information is avail-
able about the financial situation of German football clubs since they are not required
to publish detailed accounts (see Frick und Prinz, 2006). Therefore, we have to rely on
21Results for the 2nd Bundesliga are less precise compared to those for the top division. This is because
there are more teams in the second league which we are able to observe only for a few seasons (compare
Table 9). Having said this, if analyses are restricted to teams which we observe for at least 5 to 10 seasons,
results appear fairly similar.
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Figure 6: Trends in Performance Measures by League
Note: Results from Equation (3).
aggregated data published by the UEFA and the German Football League (DFL).
Figure 1 shows total revenues from media contracts, match-day earnings, merchandis-
ing, advertising, transfers and other sources by league. This information is gathered from
DFL Bundesliga reports available to us since 2006 (DFL, 2006–2015, unfortunately DFL
could not provide data for the 2nd Bundesliga before 2004). The graph shows clearly
that absolute revenues between 1st and 2nd Bundesliga have diverged. These differences
in revenues are most probably the main driver of increased differences in playing talent
between both divisions.
Several studies have highlighted the role of increasing payments to teams participating
in the UEFA Champions League [Pawlowski et al., 2010, Binder und Findlay, 2011] in
the reduction in competitive balance in Europe’s major leagues. We link inflation-adjusted
revenues from the UEFA Champions League (see Figure 1) to our measure of competi-
tive balance (for the 1st Bundesliga only) and to a linear time trend. This is illustrated in
Table 5. We use a lagged value of the UEFA Champions League payments to preclude
possible reversed causality issues and take the logarithm of the annual payments made
to Bundesliga clubs. The results indicate that UEFA Champions League may play a role
for inhibiting competitive balance. Alongside a general trend towards increasing assor-
tative matching (or a reduction in competitive balance), we find that competitive balance
decreases in seasons after large UEFA Champions League payments have been made to
Bundesliga clubs.
4.3 Drivers of Increassed Asortativeness
In this section, we look specifically at transfer and drivers of reduced competitive balance.
As outlined in Section 3, more than 70% of all players (with more than 50 games in to-
tal) appear at least at two clubs (see Table 7), a necessary precondition for our analyses.
Transfers often gain a considerable media attention, especially between Bundesliga teams:
Mario Götze’s move from Borussia Dortmund to Bayern München in 2013 was covered
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Table 5: UEFA Champions League Payments to Bundesliga Clubs and Subsequent Com-
petitive Balance
Outcome: Competitive Balance [Cor(γ j,T ,λ j +ϕ j,T )]
Estimate Std. Error t value
Log(Lagged UEFA CL Payments) 0.097∗ 0.060 1.61
Linear Time Trend 0.017∗∗ 0.0062 2.80
Intercept −0.536∗∗ 0.2094 −2.56
n 18
R2 0.63
Note: Heteroscedasticity robust standard error; p-values **: p< 0.01; *: 0.05 > p >= 0.01.
by news channels as an "Earthquake in the Bundesliga" [Kulish, April 24, 2013]. Trans-
fers between teams in our sample have increased slightly over time (today about 16% to
18% of all players in our sample played in the previous season for another team in our
sample) and it is not a priori clear whether transfers are the main driver of decreased com-
petitive balance. Bayern München, for example, won recent championships with several
top players such as David Alaba, Philipp Lahm, Thomas Müller, Bastian Schweinsteiger
who played already for their youth team. Bevor we look at the drivers of decreased com-
petitive balance, we investigate whether our measure of player performance is predictive
for movements to better teams.
Regarding transfers, common wisdom says that (only) one good season will bring you
to a (much) better team but it should also be the case that the long-term performance
matters for where you end up. We investigate this question looking at transfers only. To
investigate career building and professional decline, we look at the change in average
team effects between the destination and the origin team (λk,t − λ j,t−1). As before, we
use player fixed-effects γi as proxy for long-term performance. To measure short-term
success, we look at the average residual εiTi of individual i in the season Ti preceding the
transfer. Both explanatory variables are standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing
by the standard deviation to make effect sizes comparable. The results are shown in Table
6.22 We see that both player fixed-effects and performance deviation from the long-term
average in the season before a move are predictive for the difference in team strength due
to the transfer. This highlights that player fixed-effects take into consideration (unknown)
performance measures which are also relevant for scouts. Furthermore, scouts seem to
take into consideration also performance during an often relatively short time period for
a transfer.
In the following, we investigate whether player transfers between Bundesliga teams
drive the reduction in competitive balance. We distinguish between three groups of play-
ers, those staying in the team, moving between teams in our sample and unknown moves.
The first group are Stayers. Stayers are defined as players who have already played for
the relevant club in the previous season. These players constitute almost 50% of our sam-
22Results are robust to including individuals who do not switch teams.
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Table 6: Transfer Prediction
Outcome: Change in Team Fixed Effects (λk,t−λ j,t−1)
Estimate Std. Error t value
Player Effect (Standardized) 0.0203∗ 0.0085 2.39
Average Residual in Season before Transfer (Std.) 0.0653∗∗ 0.0079 8.29
Intercept −0.0058 0.0087 −0.66
n 2544
R2 0.0299
Note: Cluster-robust standard error (by player); p-values **: p< 0.01; *: 0.05 > p >= 0.01.
ple. The second group consists of players who move between Bundesliga teams. In other
words, players who play two consecutive seasons in either the 1st and 2nd Bundesliga but
not for the same team (ca. 15%). Movers represent transfers such as that of Mesut Özil,
who was sold by Schalke 04 to Werder Bremen in 2008, as well as loans such as that of
Toni Kroos, who was loaned by Bayern München to Bayer Leverkusen in 2009 and 2010.
A third group includes players for whom we do not know whether they previously played
for the same clubs, but in a different division (e.g. youth team), or for another team not
included in our sample, for a team in a lower division, or a team based abroad, for ex-
ample (35%). Mesut Özil for example, is classified as unknown in 2010, as he moved to
Real Madrid in the summer break. We match players with the teams to which they move
or where they stay in the subsequent season and calculate Equation (1) separately for all
three groups.
Figure 7: Assortativeness of Player and Club Fixed Effects by Player Groups
Note: Smoothing by cubic polynomial.
Figure 7 shows the correlation analysis for these three groups. The mover sample il-
lustrates positive assortative matching to clubs for all seasons. This trend is fairly stable
over time. This indicates that player transfers between Bundesliga teams reduces compet-
21
itive balance by allocating better players to better teams. However, it is not only transfers
which have caused the reduction in competitive balance over time. Bayern München, for
example, is notorious for buying player talent from temporarily competing teams such
as Bayer Leverkusen in the early 2000’s (e.g. Michael Ballack or Lucio), Werder Bre-
men (e.g. Miroslav Klose or Claudio Pizarro) or, most recently, Borussia Dortmund (e.g.
Mario Götze or Robert Lewandowski).
In contrast, the other two groups show a strong increase in assortativeness over time,
up until approximately 2012. Reduction in competitive balance is therefore attributed to
two other mechanisms. Firstly, the increased availability of up-and-coming young players
to play in the top divisions of the Bundesliga has reduced competitive balance. These
young players are trained in clubs’ own youth academies, which have been mandatory
since 2002/03, or are attracted to clubs at a young age. The transfer of players from abroad
may also play a significant role here. Secondly, competitive balance may be reduced by
the retention of certain players, e.g. top stars such as Bernd Leno, Thomas Müller or
Marco Reus who could have left the Bundesliga in the mid 2000s, when German teams
were performing badly in international competitions.
5 Conclusion
We offer a new approach to measuring player performance which enables us to investi-
gate the role of player mobility for competitive balance. This approach allows us directly
to test theoretical predictions regarding transfers of player talent as described by Cairns
et al. [1986]: Hence a given team may have incentives to continue increasing its playing
strength vis-à-vis its competitors, generating attendances for itself without taking account
of any external costs of reduced attendances elsewhere, due to lessened uncertainty of out-
come. Player performance is measured by the partial correlation of each player with his
goal margin, taking into account substitutions, dismissals and other important contributors
to team success such as home advantage. Using data relating to 19 seasons of the top two
divisions of the German Bundesliga plus domestic cup matches, we investigate changing
trends in the distribution of player talent across clubs. Player talent is arguably the most
important prerequisite for success in sports and its distribution is therefore a critical mea-
sure of the degree of competitive balance. By linking the distribution of player talent to
competitive balance, we overcome problems faced by the previous literature which relied
mostly on aggregated end-of-season league position and could often not detect significant
changes over time.
Our results indicate that there is a clear trend towards a more unequal distribution
of player talent across teams in the German Bundesliga top divisions between 1998 and
2016. We interpret this as a reduction in competitive balance. Drivers of this decline
in competitive balance are, on the one hand, rising inter-divisional inequality of teams,
coaches and players between the two German top football divisions. On the other hand,
we see increasing assortative matching of players to teams within the top division of
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the German football league system (1st Bundesliga). This does not hold for the 2nd
Bundesliga where financial endowments such as media payments grew much more slowly
compared to those in the 1st Bundesliga, where strong increases in revenue have been seen
over the last two decades.
We show that there is a circular trend, whereby more successful teams tend to attract
better players. We point out that UEFA Champions League payments might play a distinct
role in allowing certain clubs to attract better player talent. Furthermore, we show that the
reduction in competitive balance is not driven by the direct movement of players between
Bundesliga clubs. It is rather the increased hiring of talented players at a younger age from
abroad, which explain the reduction in competitive balance. Furthermore, the retention of
players by certain teams also increasingly drives these trends.
We confirm the results found by Groot [2008] or Pawlowski et al. [2010] who also
provide evidence for decreased competitive balance in the 1st Bundesliga in recent years,
and add information about the 2nd Bundesliga which has been neglected in the previ-
ous literature. In line with our results, Pawlowski et al. [2010] also finds that increasing
Champions League payments is one remarkable driver of this development, not only in
Germany but also in other European Leagues. However, our results differ from the find-
ings of earlier studies (see Section 2.1) which did not detect any changes in competitive
balance for the beginning of our sample period. It is difficult to say why these studies
come to inconclusive results since each study uses a different (aggregated) method with
varying sample periods. Using individual level player data, we are able to provide clear
evidence for gradually declining competitive balance. Hereby, we reveal important theo-
retical causes: how competitive balance is determined by player mobility.
Nevertheless, we are unable to assess whether more competitive balance is desirable.
Increased assortative matching may be socially optimal since more successful teams have
usually a larger fan base. Indeed, economics theory is also unable to provide an answer
to this question. On the one hand, the 1st Bundesliga has the highest average stadium
attendance amongst football leagues worldwide, and attendance figures have risen con-
siderably within the last two decades. This may indicate that the degree of competitive
balance is currently not harmful to levels of fan interest (and empirical studies have so far
not found a link between measures of competitive balance and stadium attendance). On
the other hand, Bayern München has just won a record fourth consecutive championship
with total points at the end of the season unseen only a few years ago. Based on our
results, one could argue that the football market seems to work efficiently by allowing
increasingly better equipped teams to attract better players. Regulations such as salary
caps, gate sharing or restrictions on the transfer of young players could potentially help to
increase competitive balance by if this is considered beneficial. Further research should
investigate more thoroughly the long-term impact of competitive balance on fan interest
and should provide recommendations where necessary.
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A Appendix
A.1 Data Preparation
Data has been separately prepared in R and Stata. Table 7 shows the descriptive statistics
for three different datasets.
As mentioned before, the hierarchical fixed effects model requires strong separability
of team, player and coach effects in order to disentangle goal margin variation attributable
to team, player and coach specific performance. Separate identification of individual and
team fixed effects is only satisfied if all clubs are connected through player mobility,
see Abowd und Kramarz [1999]. Therefore, team effects and player effects cannot be
disentangled if respective teams and players are only jointly observed. Mover players aid
separation concerning this dimension, while also enabling separation of player and team
effects for non-movers. As depicted in Table 7, approximately two-fifth of "Sample All"
are mover players which is much larger than in other areas such as firm mobility (e.g.
Card et al., 2013). Even new teams relegated to the 2nd Bundesliga usually have several
players with previous Bundesliga experience in their squad which allows to disentangle
player and teams effects as well (see also Table 9). In our main sample of players who
appear in at least 50 games in total, more than two-thirds of all players play for at least two
teams. By excluding players with less than 50 matches, we admittedly lose 57.8% of all
players but only 13,9% of all player x match observations since lineup players are mostly
quite experienced (or will be quite experienced at the end of their career). We do not
loose any entire match observation.23 As separate identification is more accessible when
only considering mover players - observed at least at two different clubs - we introduce
the sub-sample b) Mover 50+, used as a robustness check.
Furthermore, a similar match condition for coaches is imposed: Only coaches with at
least 18 match observations are considered in all samples. All coaches failing to meet this
condition are treated as interim coaches, used as the reference category in our estimation.
There is a large number of interim coaches, 105 out of 364 coaches in our sample manage
less than 10 games in total. Two promising coaches manage their respective team for all
seasons we observe them in our sample (Dirk Schuster at SV Darmstadt 98 and Frank
Schmidt at 1. FC Heidenheim). Therefore, we cannot separate team and coach fixed
effects in these cases and we treat them as reference coaches. This does not influence our
results since we add up team and coach fixed effects for the covariance analyses in Section
4 but it could explain the high team effects of SV Darmstadt 98 and 1. FC Heidenheim
which represent to some extent coach ability.
Finals in the German Cup are held in Berlin since 1985. To account for the fact that
there is no true home team in finals, we add another home category for those matches and
count both teams neither as home nor as away.
23A few matches from the viewpoint of Jahn Regensburg are missing.
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Table 7: Data Sets
a) Sample All c) Sample 50+ d) Mover 50+
# Players 5,072 2,140 1,514
Mover Share 39.4% 70.7% 1
# Teams 73
# Coaches 364
# Coaches 215 (57.9% appear at least for two teams)
(>17 matches)
Player x Match Obs. 334,234 287,685 223,452
A.2 Robustness
A.2.1 Analysis on the Match-Level
The outcome of a match is the joint result of all players on the pitch (and depends of
course on the performance of the opposing team). In our approach so far (Equation (1)),
we have not taken into account fellow players. The error terms of different players who
appear together in a given match are correlated. This leads to correlation of the error term
across team members and, furthermore, to serial correlation of the error term over time,
biasing the covariance matrix of the coefficients.24 An econometric issue regarding the
point estimates might arise if for example the performance of players depent on fellow
players, e.g. if a left-winger is used to play together with a certain left-back. Moreover,
it is possible that those two players play often together against stronger opponents. This
leads to an omitted-variable bias with its familiar problems. To account for this fact, we
use a second model on match level where we look simultaneously at all players on the
pitch. Here, we allow individual player performance to be correlated with fellow players
(and opponents).
In this approach, each player of one team in a given match ’receives’ the same goal
margin, irrespective of whether he was in the lineup or substituted in later. In the previous
analysis, we related to each player the goal margin achieved during his playing time (often
a zero for late substitutions). Here we relocate the analysis to the match level (or, to
be more precise, to the match-team level).25 Each player impact is still weighted by
the number of minutes he played during a match. Substitutes therefore have (still) less
influence than players who are on the pitch during the entire match. We illustrate this
approach again by the match between Bayern München and FC Augsburg (see Table 2)
and the following two final matches of Bayern München in the season 2014/15.
Using this approach, we have to take into account multicollinearity due to the fact that
many players often appear together in a given match. These players are therefore statis-
tically difficult to distinguish. We use a linear ridge regression model which is a popular
24We used multiway clustering on a high level (player and team) to take into account these correlations
[Cameron und Miller, 2015] when referring to variance estimates.
25Different goal margins for players with different playing time in a given match would also be possible
by shifting the analysis to a minute-based match analysis.
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Table 8: Data Sets
Goal Home × Team Bayern Team Opponent Opponent Opponent Player
Margin 2014/15 München . . . Sent-Offs . . . FC Augsburg SC Freiburg Mainz Neuer Lahm Dante Xabi Alonso T. Müller Lewandowski . . .
-1 1 1 . . . 1 . . . 1 0 0 0.846 0.154 1 0 0.813 0.813 ...
-1 0 1 . . . 0 . . . 0 1 0 1 0.209 0 0.703 0.297 1 ...
2 1 1 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 1 1 1 1 0.582 0.505 0.802 ...
method in machine learning if the number of observations is not very large compared
to the number of coefficients to be estimated [Friedman et al., 2001]. Ridge regression
minimizes a penalized residual sum of squares.26
argmin
β
[2∗N
∑
i=1
(
Goal_Margini−β0−
p
∑
j=1
xi jβ j
)2
+λ
p
∑
j=1
β 2j
]
(4)
Here, we look at match j from the viewpoint of each participating team (the number of
observations is therefore 2 ∗N = 24,262, twice the number N of matches in our sam-
ple).27 x has column rank p = 2,307 mostly consisting of player indicators (2140) but
also columns for each team (73), opponent (73), sent-offs (4), and home advantage (inter-
acted with season to account for shrinking home advantage over time, 19). For simplicity,
we do not include season, league, coaches and further interaction between season or home
advantage and league (which were not very relevant in the previous analysis).28 λ con-
trols the amount of shrinkage and is estimated via 20-fold cross-validation.29 Again, we
restrict the analysis to all players with at least 50 observations because those coefficients
would be shrunk toward zero anyway and are less informative.
Results on the match-level mostly confirm the results presented in this paper: Coeffi-
cients for player strength derived from the ridge regression (Equation (4)) are positively
correlated with average standardized (by season) player fixed-effects (ρ ≈ 0.44) or unstan-
dardized coefficients (ρ ≈ 0.28) from Equation (1). Taking fellow players into account,
we find again a strong increase in assortative matching between players and teams (Equa-
tion (2)) for teams which we observe for at least 10 seasons.30 We do not find trends in
assortative matching among all teams which is not surprising since coefficients for teams
with fewer seasons are shrunk towards zero. Although the number of observations for
teams is large compared to the number of observations for each player, we find a sur-
prisingly low correlation (ρ ≈ 0.26) for the coefficients of teams, derived from the ridge
regression compared to the coefficients estimated in Equation (1). Results regarding team
strength estimated in Equation (4) are, in our view, not entirely convincing. For example,
26For calculation we use the glmnet package for R [Friedman et al., 2010]. Ridge regression methods
have also been proposed by Kiefel und Warnke [2015] and Sæbø und Hvattum [2015].
27We lose 4 match-team observations due to insufficient number of players with at least 50 games.
28Including these variables does not alter our results. The only exception is coaches which further reduces
the statistical power of our analysis and gives very noisy results for many teams and coaches for which we
have few observations.
29k-fold cross-validation partitions the original sample into k subsamples of equal size. k−1 samples are
used as training set and one remaining sample is then used for validation. This exercise is repeated k times.
As loss function we use the mean squared error criterion. For simplicity, we ignore the here the hierarchical
nature of the data.
30Surprisingly, the correlation is strongly negative for earlier seasons.
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VfR Aalen, SV Wehen Wiesbaden and Wacker Burghausen are included among top five
teams (and Bayern München is only ranked 8th). In contrast, coefficients of teams have
been convincing in the previous analyses (compare Figure 4). We interpret this finding
that the estimated shrinkage parameter λ should probably penalize teams differently to
players (e.g. via a hierarchical model). Interestingly, running Equation (4) with or without
team indicators does not alter the results for player strength, the correlation between the
model described in this paragraph and a parsimonious model without team information
and some further interaction (see below) gives a correlation coefficient of ρ ≈ 0.978.31
Looking deeper into this topic is beyond the scope of this study but future research should
investigate for example a hierarchical ridge regression framework in this context.
Apart from the positive trend described in the previous analysis, we offer further evi-
dence to confirm our results. Similar to Sæbø und Hvattum [2015], we drop team infor-
mation in Equation (4) and use only player information (plus indicators for the season-
specific home advantage and the opponent) and use a very simple measure of team per-
formance: The average points achieved in our sample period.32 Correlating these player
coefficients with the naive measure of team performance, we find a strong increase in
assortative matching. This confirms our previous results as shown in Figure 8. The cor-
relation is larger and less volatile for the 1st Bundesliga for which we find a more or less
steady increase (with the exception of two seasons 2006/07 and 2007/08). For the case of
the 2nd Bundesliga, it seems that assortative matching has also increased from being at
around 0.2 until 2008/09 to around 0.3 to 0.4 thereafter (except for the season 2012/13).
Figure 8: Assortative Matching (Ridge Regression on the Match-Level)
(a) Both Leagues (b) By League
31In contrast, dropping team information in Equation (1) alters player coefficients much more.
32Unsurprisingly given the large correlation between player coefficients with or without team information
(see paragraph above ρ ≈ 0.978), results look quite similar if we use the model including team indicators
and further interaction terms for this analyses.
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A.2.2 Ridge Regression Estimate of Equation (1)
We have estimated Equation (1) using ordinary least squares (OLS) to present a simple
and widely used (unbiased) estimator. Several recent publications have investigated the
distribution of fixed-effects which were estimated via OLS, e.g. Card et al. [2013] or
Chetty et al. [2014]. Results presented in this paper are robust to estimating Equation (1)
using ridge regression which gives some bias for the coefficients but a lower variance (see
Appendix A.2.1 for more details about ridge regression). Figure 9 shows the results for
the assortative matching (Equation (2)) when we use ridge regression to estimate Equa-
tion (1).33 As in the previous Section, we use 20-fold cross-validation to calibrate the
shrinkage parameter. We base this analysis (as in the case of the OLS) on the sample of
players who appear in at least 50 matches and coaches with more than 17 games because
the ridge regression becomes computationally intensive for larger samples (and coeffi-
cients for players with few games would be shrunk toward zero anyway). Interestingly,
we do not find a negative correlation in the beginning of the sample period as in Figure 5
when we use ridge regression. This indicates that the (small) negative correlation in the
beginning is due to greater uncertainty in the first (and last) seasons in our sample because
players in these seasons tend to play for fewer total (sample) matches. Ridge regression
takes this into account by penalizing those coefficients.
Figure 9: Assortativity Matching (Ridge Regression for Equation (1))
A.2.3 Robustness to Other Samples
The main conclusions are robust to considering a different match condition or only mover
players (where separate identification of players and teams is more straightforward and
33For the ridge regression approach, we use weights for the correlation (Equation (2)) but not to estimate
player, team and coach coefficients (Equation (1)).
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precise estimation more accessible) as shown in Figure 10. Sample selection does not
drive our results (players with at least 50 observations are of course a selected sample of
all players appearing in the 1st or 2nd Bundesliga. To show this, we estimate Equation (1)
and Equation (2) separately for the sample of players who appear at least in two teams and
those with at least 10 matches. Furthermore, we exclude Bayern München in Equation
(2) for the standard sample to assure that results are not driven by one team. Results
are weaker for the robustness checks than for the standard sample but an increase in
assortative matching is obvious for different samples considered.34 Furthermore, a match
Figure 10: Assortativity Matching (for Different Samples)
might be already decided at a certain point of time if one team has a large goal margin.
Here, teams might bring players who are supposed to get some playing experience, e.g.
after injuries, without large incentives to change the actual goal difference. To check
whether this changes our results, we ran the analysis based on the sample of lineup and
full-time players only. This does not alter the interpretation of our results.
A.2.4 Robustness to Other Outcomes
Our analyses show that playing talent is increasingly unequally distributed across divi-
sions and within the 1st Bundesliga but this does not hold for the 2nd Bundesliga. This
pattern is also apparent for the last ten seasons if we look at betting odds for German Cup
matches. Unfortunately, betting odds are only available since 2005 but since then there is
a clear pattern: If we look at average maximum odd over time for German Cup matches
34We expect weaker analyses for different reasons. First, movers for example are not the main driver for
increased assortative matching, see for example Section 4.3 and the sample size is here reduced. Second,
Bayern München is the team with both the highest team fixed effect and the highest average player per-
formance. Third, although the sample of players playing at least 10 matches is considerably higher than
the "50+ sample", performance measures are much less precise in this analysis due to the large random
component natural to sports matches (the residual variation makes up slightly more than 80% of the total
variation in a variance decomposition for Equation (1)).
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between teams of the same league, we see that the average maximum odd has increased
statistically significantly for matches between two teams playing in the 1st Bundesliga but
no time trend is discernible for matches between two 2nd Bundesliga teams (the number
of matches between teams of the 2nd Bundesliga is with 43 compared to 105 considerably
lower but a time plot shows in this case a more or less flat line). The average maximum
odd has also increased significantly for the 152 matches between 1st Bundesliga and 2nd
Bundesliga teams. Looking at football odds, therefore, also indicates decreasing compet-
itive balance between the top two divisions of the German Bundesliga and within the 1st
Bundesliga.
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A.3 Validity of our measure
Does our measure of the partial correlation of player’s appearance on the pitch and the
goal margin constitute a valid proxy for performance? We give several arguments why
this might be the case. First, in a separate study we show that this approach can be used
to give good predictions for future football matches based only on player data (and home
advantage).35 Secondly, our measure is correlated with expert ratings for players’ per-
formance – not only with current expert ratings but also with future expert ratings (see
Kiefel und Warnke, 2015). The Pearson correlation coefficient between players’ perfor-
mance measured by Equation (2) and by players’ average grades during the whole period
is ρ = −.26 (in Germany lower grades are better). If we adopt a similar approach as in
Equation (2) for grades (where we replace goal difference as an outcome with goals), we
get a correlation coefficient of ρ = −.79. This shows that the partial correlation of each
player with the goal margin is closely related with a ratings by experts used in other stud-
ies such as Buraimo et al. [2015].
Figure 11: Association Between Player Performance measured by Grades and by Goal
Margin
Figure 12 shows the distribution of player performance for players who appear only
in the 1st Bundesliga (25%), who always play in the sample period in the 2nd Bundesliga
(23%) and those of play for teams in both divisions (52%). The distributions look reason-
able with a clear hierarchy but considerable overlap between players of different divisions.
The density estimation is based on 2,138 unique appearances in at least 50 games in our
sample and it is slightly skewed to the left since better players play more matches on av-
erage. We find a similar convincing hierarchy for the sum of team and coach effects (see
Figure 4).
35This is still work in progress but a current version is available upon request.
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Figure 12: Distribution of Player Performance (Player Fixed-Effects for Players with at
least 50 games)
Note: Kernel density estimates of individual player performance (for players with at least 50 games) with
fixed bandwidth of 0.05. The densities are slightly skewed to left because players with high fixed-effects
play more games on average.
Furthermore, we have shown in Section 4.3 that player fixed-effects are important
for transfers (besides short-term performance prior to a transfer, see Table 6). A fur-
ther anecdotal evidence for the validity of our measure can be seen if one looks at the
top players who still played in 2015/16 (the last season we observe) in the 50+ Sam-
ple: This lists includes many acclaimed Bayern München players such as Xabi Alonso,
Robert Lewandowski, Javi Martinez, Manuel Neuer, Philip Lahm, Frank Ribery or Arjen
Robben, Brasilian footballers such as Dante, Luiz Gustavo and Naldo (currently play-
ing for VfL Wolfsburg). But also players like Kagawa or Lukasz Piszczek who won
two championships with Borussia Dortmund or Granit Xhaka, who will move to Arse-
nal London in the next season, and Yann Sommer, the first-team regular goalkeeper for
Switzerland, from Borussia Mönchengladbach. We could only find few surprises such as
Jan Simunek who plays currently for VfL Bochum and is the only 2nd Bundesliga player
within the top 20 players in 2015/16.
35
Table 9: Teams in the Sample
Team G S P C Team G S P C
Bayern München 722 19 (19) 107 8 Rot Weiss Ahlen 279 8 (0) 76 11
VfB Stuttgart 688 19 (19) 136 17 FC Ingolstadt 04 245 7 (1) 58 8
Werder Bremen 688 19 (19) 111 7 Dynamo Dresden 175 5 (0) 48 5
VfL Wolfsburg 687 19 (19) 141 14 VfL Osnabrück 175 5 (0) 63 5
Borussia Dortmund 685 19 (19) 107 9 Wacker Burghausen 174 5 (0) 36 4
Bayer 04 Leverkusen 684 19 (19) 120 12 Kickers Offenbach 143 4 (0) 37 5
FC Schalke 04 684 19 (19) 121 14 Stuttgarter Kickers 142 4 (0) 30 7
Eintracht Frankfurt 677 19 (14) 141 14 SV Sandhausen 141 4 (0) 35 3
1. FC Kaiserslautern 677 19 (11) 160 13 Waldhof Mannheim 141 4 (0) 38 4
Bor. Mönchengladbach 676 19 (16) 145 15 TuS Koblenz 140 4 (0) 40 4
1860 München 676 19 (7) 132 14 1. FC Saarbrücken 139 4 (0) 38 5
SC Freiburg 675 19 (12) 114 4 Carl Zeiss Jena 109 3 (0) 31 5
VfL Bochum 673 19 (10) 138 11 VfR Aalen 107 3 (0) 23 3
1. FC Köln 672 19 (11) 137 18 SSV Reutlingen 05 106 3 (0) 26 4
Hamburger SV 671 19 (19) 132 14 SSV Ulm 1846 105 3 (1) 23 4
Hertha BSC 670 19 (17) 131 12 Eintracht Trier 105 3 (0) 24 1
1. FC Nürnberg 670 19 (12) 141 14 Fortuna Köln 103 3 (0) 20 3
1. FSV Mainz 05 667 19 (10) 135 10 Tennis Borussia Berlin 73 2 (0) 23 3
SpVgg Greuther Fürth 667 19 (1) 141 9 1. FC Heidenheim 72 2 (0) 14 1
Hannover 96 635 18 (14) 119 14 SV Wehen Wiesbaden 72 2 (0) 26 4
MSV Duisburg 604 17 (5) 151 13 SV Darmstadt 98 71 2 (1) 24 1
Energie Cottbus 596 17 (6) 117 8 KFC Uerdingen 05 71 2 (0) 18 3
Karlsruher SC 593 17 (3) 117 14 RasenBallsport Leipzig 71 2 (0) 15 3
Arminia Bielefeld 567 16 (8) 126 12 Rot-Weiss Essen 71 2 (0) 30 4
FC St. Pauli 519 15 (2) 104 12 VfB Lübeck 71 2 (0) 19 1
Hansa Rostock 496 14 (9) 109 10 Chemnitzer FC 69 2 (0) 13 3
Alemannia Aachen 461 13 (1) 95 10 FC Gütersloh 69 2 (0) 18 3
FC Augsburg 354 10 (5) 76 5 SG Wattenscheid 09 69 2 (0) 11 2
Rot-Weiß Oberhausen 352 10 (0) 64 8 Jahn Regensburg 67 2 (0) 21 4
SC Paderborn 07 348 10 (1) 82 9 SV Meppen 36 1 (0) 11 2
Erzgebirge Aue 348 10 (0) 72 8 FSV Zwickau 35 1 (0) 7 1
1. FC Union Berlin 346 10 (0) 79 7 Sportfreunde Siegen 35 1 (0) 8 3
1899 Hoffenheim 327 9 (8) 65 9 SV Babelsberg 03 35 1 (0) 10 2
SpVgg Unterhaching 314 9 (2) 69 8 VfB Leipzig 35 1 (0) 9 2
Fortuna Düsseldorf 313 9 (1) 75 11 1. FC Schweinfurt 05 34 1 (0) 5 1
FSV Frankfurt 281 8 (0) 74 4 Rot-Weiß Erfurt 34 1 (0) 12 2
Eintracht Braunschweig 280 8 (1) 55 8
Note: G : Total number of games (including domestic cup games); S: Total number of seasons observed
in either the 1st Bundesliga or 2nd Bundesliga in the sample period (in parenthesis only 1st Bundesliga);
P: Total number of unique players with at least 50 games in total who appear in at least one match for
the respective team; C: Total number of unique coaches with at least 18 games in total who managed the
respective team.
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